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HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE AND 1HE 
GACACAJURISDICTIONS IN RWANDA 
L. DANIELLE TuLLY* 
Abstract: Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the Government of 
National Unity embarked upon the ambitious task of trying over 
100,000 detainees suspected of participating, at some level, in the 
genocide. By 1998, having experienced little success with formal trials, 
the goYernment began developing plans to amend the traditional 
dispute resolution mechanism, known as gacaca, in an attempt to 
achiew both justice and reconciliation. Serious criticism has been 
voiced over the gacaca jurisdictions, claiming, in part, that they fail to 
meet Rwanda's due process obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While perhaps not 
conforming to the letter of the law, the gacaca jurisdictions do have the 
potential to embody its spirit by serving the need for justice and 
accountability in Rwanda while fostering a culture of human rights 
protection in a country that has long ignored them. 
INTRODUCTION 
More than eight years have passed since the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, which took the lives of between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwan-
dese Tutsi along with tens of thousands of politically moderate Hutu.l 
Following the genocide a transition government came to power, 
dominated by Tutsi exiles.2 This new government "inherited a totally 
destroyed country, with a traumatized and impoverished population, 
a collapsed state and destroyed infrastructure. "3 While much of the 
physical infrastructure has been rebuilt during the past eight years, 
the transitional government has been largely unable to achieve justice 
* L. Danielle Tully is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor on the Boston College In-
tcmational & Compamtivc Law Review. 
1 See AusoN DEs FoRGES, LEAVE NoNE TO ThLL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RwANDA 14 
(1999). 
2 Peter Uvin, The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Par-
ticipation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda 2 (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review until May, 
2004). 
3Jd. 
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and reconciliation for the Rwandese people.4 In 1998, after ambitious 
and severely flawed attempts to try over 100,000 detainees suspected 
of some level of participation in the genocide, the government of 
Rwanda began to investigate the possibility of amending a traditional 
dispute resolution mechanism, called gacaca, in order to process 
efficiently the daunting detainee caseload in an attempt to achieve 
both justice and reconciliation for the country.5 Gacaca soon became 
the government of Rwanda's latest, and perhaps best, hope to achieve 
both justice and reconciliation for the deeply polarized people of 
Rwanda. Organic Law 40/2000, (Gacaca Law) passed on January 26, 
2001, clearly indicated the government's intent to go forward with 
establishing gacaca jurisdictions throughout the country to try crimes 
associated with the 1994 genocide.6 
Since draft legislation on establishing gacaca jurisdictions sur-
faced, numerous concerns over the gacaca jurisdictions have been 
raised by human rights activists, lawyers' groups, and academics over 
whether the Gacaca Law would signal that protection of human rights 
has taken a back seat to expediency.? It is important to recognize, 
however, that the current situation itself in Rwanda constitutes a seri-
ous violation of numerous internationally protected human rights.8 
The criticisms surrounding the gacaca jurisdictions often rely on the 
claim that Rwanda must comply with its international treaty obliga-
tions-namely, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
4 !d. 
5 See Stef Vandeginste, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparation after Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity: The Proposed Establishment of Popular Gacaca Tribunals in 
Rwanda 1 (1999) (paper presented at the All Africa Conference on African Principles of 
Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Addis Ababa Nov. 8-12, 1999, on file with the Bos-
ton College International & Comparative Law Review until May, 2004). 
6 See Loi Organique No. 40/2000 du 26/01/2001 Portant Creation des Jurisdictions 
Gacaca' et Organisation des Pousuites des Infractions Constitutives du Crime de Genocide 
ou de Crimes contra L'Humanite, Commises enter le 1 Octobre 1990 et Le 31 Decembre 
1994 [hereinafter Gacaca Law] (French text), available at http:/ /www.minijust.gov.rw (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2003). 
7 See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconcilliation in Rwanda: 
Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 
45(2) J. AFR. LAW 143 (2001). 
8 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE 
(Apr. 2000) (discussing human rights abuses associated with the search for justice in 
Rwanda), available at http:/ /web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/ AFR4 70112000 
ENGLISH/$File/ AFR4701100.pdf [hereinafter TRouBLED CouRSE OF JusTICE]; see also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, vol. 12, 
no. 1, (Apr. 2000) (discussing silencing the press, extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, 
and torture), available at http:/ /www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/ [hereinafter SEARCH 
FOR SECURITY]. 
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Rights (ICCPR).9 These criticisms fail to take into account the difficult 
nature of protecting human rights in developing countries. In coun-
tries like Rwanda, which are economically and infrastructurally very 
poor, there is little difference between protecting civil and political 
rights and protecting economic and social rights in that they both re-
quire countries with limited resources to enact positive law and to ex-
pend limited resources.' 0 Therefore, " [ t] hese rights cannot be guar-
anteed in the same way in a poor country as in a rich country, despite 
that admonition in relevant international instruments to the con-
trary. "11 Ultimately, the government of Rwanda must prioritize which 
rights it can and will protect given its limited resources and the socio-
historic context in which it is operating. 
This Note examines the newly legislated gacaca jurisdictions es-
tablished by the Gacaca Law in light of Rwanda's international obliga-
tions under the ICCPR to ensure that those charged with criminal acts 
receive a fair trial, as stipulated in Article 14 of the ICCPR. Part I 
briefly discusses the genocide in Rwanda and the attempts by the new 
government of Rwanda following the genocide to establish judicial 
accountability and foster reconciliation in the country. Part II exam-
ines the traditional practice of gacaca in Rwanda and traces its evolu-
tion through to the new gacaca jurisdictions established by Gacaca 
Law. Part III analyzes Rwanda's fair trial obligations under the ICCPR 
and argues that, while not perfect, the gacaca jurisdictions minimally 
comply with fair trial obligations. This Note concludes by advocating 
that the application of international standards must be based on the 
possible-but not unrealistic-ideals in countries like Rwanda, which 
are actively engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion. 
I. GENOCIDE AND THE SEARCH FOR jUSTICE IN RWANDA 
On April 6, 1994, then-president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyari-
mana died when the plane carrying him and Burundian president, 
Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down by two missiles as it prepared to 
land in the Kigali airport.12 Before dawn the following day, the Presi-
dential Guard and militia members began to kill political opposition 
9 See TROUBLED CouRsE OF JusncE, supra note 8, at 35. 
1o Sec William A. Shabas, justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Search-
ing for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 532 (1996). 
11 !d. 
12 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HIS'IORY OF A GENOCIDE 212 (1995). 
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leaders along with moderate Hutu. 13 The capital, Kigali, became en-
veloped by violence as Tutsis were sought out and massacred. 14 These 
massacres, however, were not spontaneous acts of violence. 15 Rather, 
systematic violence against ethnic Tutsis, who represent approxi-
mately 15% of the population, had begun during the decolonization 
process at the end of the 1950s.16 In the early 1960s, and then again in 
the 1970s, violence against the Tutsi population generated waves of 
displacement as Tutsis fled Rwanda and resettled predominantly in 
the surrounding countriesP Following independence, the Rwandan 
government in Kigali, dominated by Hutus since 1962, continually 
obstructed the return of Tutsi refugees. 18 On October 1, 1990, the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), predominantly comprised of Tutsi 
exiles who had been living in Uganda for years, invaded from across 
the northern border between Rwanda and Uganda, and a civil war 
ensued.l9 After three years of sporadic fighting, an agreement was 
reached between the Habyarimana government, the RPF, and other 
political constituencies in Rwanda.2° Signed on August 4, 1993, the 
Arusha Accords provided for power-sharing in a transitional govern-
ment, the return of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, and eventually demo-
cratic elections in 1997.21 
Extremist elements in Rwanda refused to accept the Arusha Ac-
cords, viewing them as unacceptable compromises. 22 Importing arms 
from abroad, they trained two militia groups that eventually helped to 
carry out the genocide-the Interaharnwe "Those who Attack To-
gether," and the Irnpuzamugarnbi "Those with a Single Purpose. "23 
Soon after the massacres began in April 1994, following the death of 
president Habyarimana, civil war in Rwanda resumed, ending the 
cease-fire that had been in effect since August 4, 1993.24 From April to 
July of 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and tens 
of thousands of politically moderate Hutus were brutally killed in the 
13 !d. at 229-30. 
14 !d. at 231. 
15 See Shabas, supra note 10, at 523. 
16 !d. at 523-24. 
17 !d. at 524. 
18 !d. 
19 !d. 
2° Shabas, supra note 10, at 524. 
21 !d. 
22 !d. 
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ AFRICA, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA APRIL-MAY 1994, vol. 6, no 
4, at 2 (May 1994), available at http:/ /hrw.org/reports/world/rwanda-pubs.php. 
24 !d. at 4. 
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genocide.25 By July 17, 1994, the Tutsi-dominated RPF had established 
the Government of National Unity, bringing both the genocide and 
the civil war to an end.26 
Following the genocide, Rwanda entered a precarious phase of 
post-conflict reconstruction.27 The RPF and the international com-
munity pushed for criminal trials that would bring the perpetrators of 
the genocide to justice.28 Shortly following its establishment, the new 
government announced that it would not extend amnesty to the per-
petrators of the genocide, but would prosecute all those accused in-
stead.29 Between July, 1994, and September, 1998, arrests averaged 
between 1000 and 3000 per month.30 As a result, the overall prison 
population in Rwanda increased from 10,000 in 1994 to nearly 
130,000 by 1998.31 Initially, Human Rights Watch/Mrica leveled 
charges at the government of Rwanda for improper arrests without 
warrants, arrests based on denunciation rather than criminal investi-
gation, and detention without arraignment in violation of Rwandan 
law.32 Rather than collecting evidence and filing formal charges, the 
RPF soldiers entered villages in which most of the Tutsi population 
had been massacred and simply rounded up individuals who ap-
peared to be genocidaires and incarcerated them in local facilities.33 
. Although arrests in Rwanda following the genocide increased 
drastically, initial efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice were in 
fact quite limited.34 In November 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; 
however, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) criticized the in-
ternational community for failing to deliver sufficient aid to the new 
25 DEs FoRGES, supra note I, at 14. 
26 See Shabas, supra note I 0, at 524. 
27 Sec id. 
28 Mark Drumbl, Rule of Law amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda :r Domes-
tic Genocide Trials, 29 CoLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 545,565 (I998). 
29 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ AFRICA, RWANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE? INCREASED IN-
TERNATIONAl. EFFORTS REQUIRED TO PUNISH GENOCIDE AND PREVENT FURTHER BLOOD-
SHED, vol. 6 no. I2, at 9 (Dec. I994), available at http:/ /www.hrw.org/africa/index.php 
[hereinafter RWANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE?]. 
!0 INTERNATIONAl. CRISIS GROUP, FIVE YEARS AFTER "IHE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: jus-
"llCE IN QuEsTioN 10 (I999), available at http:/ /www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/central 
africa/reports/ A400224_0704I999.pdf. 
~ 1 Drumbl, supra note 28, at 571. 
~2 Sec RWANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE?, supra note 29, at 9. 
~~ Sec Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 
DuKEj. CoMP. & INT'I. L. 349, 352 (I997). 
~4 RwANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE?, supra note 29, at 2. 
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Rwandan government to rebuild a competent civilian administration 
and judicial system.35 According to Human Rights Watch, "many 
judges and prosecutors [who] were killed during the genocide, were 
themselves implicated in the killings, or fled the country."36 Others 
have charged additionally that "[i]n fact, the Rwandan legal system 
has never been more than a corrupt caricature of justice," in which 
"[e]ven well-meaning lawyers and judges within the system were pow-
erless to prosecute the numerous atrocities during the few years that 
foreshadowed the 1994 genocide."37 This suggests that even if the ju-
dicial system had not been decimated during the genocide it would 
not have been capable of administering impartial justice, especially in 
the wake of the violence and conflict that had subsumed the coun-
try.38 Mired in a history of impunity, and with few resources, the new 
government of Rwanda found itself largely unable to carry out this 
type of large-scale judicial process, yet bound rhetorically to do so de-
spite the crippling constraints.39 
Compounding this already dire crisis, in mid:July 1994, approxi-
mately 850,000 Rwandans of predominantly Hutu origin fled with the 
defeated Rwandan Army and the paramilitary across the Rwandan 
border into the North Kivu province of what is now the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DR C) .4° Causing a humanitarian crisis of epic 
proportions, this large displacement of Rwandese Hutus also provided 
a human shield for the genocidaires, enabling them to regroup in the 
camps and to call for renewed war.41 The government-in-exile contin-
ued to destabilize the already volatile situation by spreading propa-
ganda that in fact the RPF was responsible for genocide against the 
Hutu, making no mention of the massive slaughter of Tutsi. 42 The 
situation across the border in Zaire occupied the RPF forces, who 
were the only force maintaining any sort of order in much of 
35 !d. 
36 !d. at 9. 
37 Shabas, supra note 10, at 531. Shabas describes massacres of Tutsi that took place in 
March of 1992 in which 466 individuals were arrested and detained illegally for this atroc-
ity. !d. A lawyer retained by an extremist political party was able to get the detainees re-
leased. Rather than correcting the situation and issuing new warrants, the prosecutors' 
office did not pursue the matter further. !d. at 531-32. 
38 See id. at 531. 
39 See RwANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE?, supra note 29, at 9. 
40 See Shabas, supra note 10, at 524. 
41 See RwANDA: A NEW CATASTROPHE?, supra note 29, at 3. 
42 !d. at 3-4. 
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Rwanda-including arresting those accused of genocide.43 It also 
made the task of ensuring justice and promoting reconciliation within 
Rwanda nearly impossible.44 
A. AttemjJts at justice: Organic Law 8/96 
Although Rwanda had ratified the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Rwanda's penal 
code did not expressly punish genocide or crimes against humanity. 45 
As a result, emotional debates ensued in the Rwandese Transitional 
National Assembly over how to adopt new measures that would satisfy 
the need for justice in Rwanda.46 In November, 1995, the government 
of Rwanda organized an international conference on "Genocide, Im-
punity, and Accountability" (Conference) in Kigali.47 The meeting 
brought together leaders of Rwandan society, foreign legal experts, 
representatives of local NGOs, and genocide victims' associations to 
discuss the complex problems that would arise in prosecuting the 
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.48 The Conference recommended 
that the Rwandan government create new mechanisms to deal with 
the genocide cases.49 These new mechanisms included creating "spe-
cialized chambers of the existing courts, a classification scheme to 
separate the main organizers of the genocide from criminals with 
lesser degrees of responsibility, and a unique scheme aimed at en-
couraging offenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced 
sentences. "50 
Following this Conference, the Rwandan Ministry of Justice be-
gan to prepare legislation giving effect to recommendations made at 
the Conference.51 On August 30, 1996, the National Assembly 
adopted Organic Law 8/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
43 /d. at 9. In addition to prm·iding security, the RPF themselves were also engaged in 
several massacres of unarmed and unresisting civilians. ld at 8-9. These human rights 
abuses have largely gone un-addressed in Rwanda. /d. at 8. 
44 Sec id. 
45 LAWYERS COMMilTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A 
LAWYERS COMMHTEE REI'ORT ON TilE ICTR AND NATIONAL ThiALS § VJII.c (july 1997), 
available at http:/ /~ww.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/rwanda.htm [hereinafter PROSECUT-
ING (;ENOCIIlE]. 
46Jd. 
47 Shabas, supra note I 0, at 528. 
48 !d. at 528-29. 
49 !d. at 530. 
50 /d. 
51 /d. 
392 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:385 
Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Hu-
manity Since October 1, 1990 (Organic Law 8/96) to organize geno-
cide trials.52 The Constitutional Court subsequently approved the new 
statute, which then came into force on September 1, 1996.53 In pass-
ing Organic Law 8/96, the government of Rwanda hoped to reduce 
the number of trials, to encourage people to give incriminating evi-
dence that would facilitate other prosecutions, and to enhance the 
process of reconciliation in the country. 54 
Following the recommendation of the Kigali conference, Or-
ganic Law 8/96 created special chambers within the twelve First In-
stance Courts to try people accused of genocide.55 It also established 
four categories of genocide suspects.56 Category I includes planners, 
organizers, instigators, supervisors, and leaders of the genocide.57 
Generally, Category I suspects are those who held positions of power 
within Rwandese society and thus were able to use this power and the 
trust of the populace to carry out the genocide.58 Category II com-
prises perpetrators of, or accomplices to, intentional homicide or se-
rious assaults that resulted in death.59 Category III includes those who 
committed serious assaults against others without causing death.6° Fi-
nally, Category N suspects are those who committed offenses against 
property.61 
In addition to establishing the procedure whereby genocide sus-
pects would be categorized into four separate groupings, Organic Law 
8/96 also attempted to deal with potential prosecutorial barriers such 
as the lack of evidence for the majority of crimes committed between 
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.62 For instance, while there is 
some evidence of top level involvement that can be verified through 
lists of arms distributions, newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts, 
"there is hardly any evidence to substantiate the involvement of the 
52 Organic Law No. 8/96 of August 30, 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed 
Since October 1, 1990, at http:/ /preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (last 
visited Ja. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Organic Law 8/96). 
53 Shabas, supra note 10, at 530. 
54 PROSECUTING GENOCIDE, supra note 45, §VIII-C. 
55 Organic Law 8/96, supra note 52, art. 19. 
56 !d. art. 2. 
57 !d. 
58 !d. 
59 !d. 
60 Organic Law 8/96, supra note 52, art. 2. 
61 !d. 
62 See Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 8. 
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large majority of 'ordinary' killers: most eyewitnesses had been killed 
or had left the country. "63 As a result, Organic Law 8/96 instituted a 
confession and guilty plea procedure that would allow those who con-
fessed according to the law and provided evidence against other sus-
pects to receive considerable reduction in penalty.64 This confession 
procedure, unfamiliar to the Rwandan judicial system, was inspired by 
"plea bargaining," which is widely used in common law criminal jus-
tice systems.65 Viewed as an instrument to overcome the general lack 
of evidence available to try suspects of genocidal crimes, the confes-
sion and guilty pleas were also intended to establish the truth of the 
genocide, which had been continually challenged by extremist Hutu 
revisionism, and to serve as a source of justice and reconciliation for 
victims.66 
B. Further Attempts to ilddress the Growing Detainee Caseload in Rwanda 
Despite these procedures for categorizing suspects, which would 
enable speedier prosecution, the massive number of arrests and de-
tentions meant that thousands of detainees languished for years on 
end in prisons with little hope of facing trial.67 In September, 1996, 
the Rwandan government attempted to regularize the tens of thou-
sands of illegal arrests and detentions that had taken place since the 
genocide by issuing the Organic Law 9 /96-Law relating to provi-
sional modifications to the Criminal Procedure Code (Organic Law 
9/96), which entered into force retroactively to April 6, 1994.68 The 
objective of passing Organic Law 9/96 was to establish temporary 
derogations from statutory deadlines prescribed by the Code of 
Criminal Procedure for issuing an arrest record, a provisional arrest 
63Jd. 
64 Organic Law 8/96, supra note 52, arts. 4-9. According to the law, Category I suspects 
are not able to a\·ail themselves of reduced sentencing for confession. !d. art. 5. Suspects in 
Category II may attempt to receiw a reduced sentence of seven to fifteen years imprison-
ment for confession and implication. !d. arts. 15, 16. Those who do not avail themselves of 
this procedure will face life imprisonment if found guilty. !d. art. 14. Category III suspects 
may also seek reduced sentences of 1/2 to 1/3 of the full sentence. !d. arts. 5, 15-16. 
65 Shabas, supra note 10, at 539. 
66 Sec Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 8; RWANDA: A NEw CATASTROPHE?, supra note 29, at 
3-4; Shabas, supra note 10, at 539. 
67 Sec Garine Hovsepian, The Gacaca Tribunals for Trying Genocide Crimes and 
Rwanda's Fair Trial Obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 4 (2001) (unpublished thesis, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Interna-
tionalales, on file with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
68 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 9. 
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warrant, and a preventive detention order.69 According to Organic 
Law 9/96, individuals who had been detained before the enactment 
of Organic Law 9/96 were to have a record of arrest drawn up and a 
warrant for arrest issued by December 31, 1997, and then appear be-
fore a judge within ninety days of the issuance of the arrest warrant.70 
For those who became detained after the enactment of Organic Law 
9/96, they were to have a warrant issued within four months of the 
actual arrest and were to appear within three months after the war-
rant had been issued.71 These accelerated deadlines, while an attempt 
to ameliorate arrest and detention procedures, were unrealistic. 72 As a 
result, the Rwandan government had to extend the application of the 
law until August 31, 1999, providing little if any relief to tens of thou-
sands of detainees being held without case files. 73 
With few prospects for expediting the justice process in Rwanda, 
many believed that the best way to ease overcrowding would be to re-
lease prisoners.74 Considering that the Transitional Government of 
National Unity had maintained since 1994 that there could be no 
reconciliation without justice, there was serious debate as to how re-
leases could be accelerated in a manner that would be compatible 
with justice and that did not provoke protests or violent reprisals from 
the local people.75 Special Representative of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Michel Mousalli, in a report to the 
United Nations General Assembly, noted that "[t]here was fierce resis-
tance when the Government announced, on 6 October 1998, that it 
planned to release 10,000 prisoners who had no judicial files."76 
lbuka, one of the main genocide survivors' organizations, staged a 
public campaign to denounce the release of pre-trial detainees as a 
denial of justice.77 By June 15, 1999 only 3365 pre-trial detainees of 
the 10,000 promised had been released.78 In addition, reports sur-
faced that those who had been released from detention were targets 
69 Id. 
70 Drumbl, supra note 28, at 574. 
71 /d. 
72 /d. 
73 See id. 
74 R£port of the Special R£presentative of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Rwanda, Michel Moussalli, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 116(c), at 
30, U.N. Doc. A/55/59 (2000) [hereinafter Moussalli R£port 2000]. 
75 See id. 
7s Id. 
77 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 9. 
78 !d. 
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of violent acts.79 Some individuals even sought refuge back in the 
prisons.80 Even when they were not directly targeted, those released 
found it hard to reintegrate.81 Faced with this daunting detainee load 
and the prospect of further violence if large numbers of detainees 
were released, on October 17, 1998 Rwandan President Pasteur Bizi-
mungu, in consultation with both political and civil society leaders, 
decided to establish a Commission to look at possible mechanisms for 
increasing public participation in judicial proceedings.s2 Chaired by 
the Minister of Justice, this fifteen-member Commission published an 
official document detailing a proposal for gacaca tribunals on June 8, 
1999.83 
II. GACACA: THE LATEST HoPE FoR jusTICE IN RwANDA 
A. Historical Rnots of Gacaca 
Relatively little is known about the practice of gacaca, a commu-
nity-based dispute resolution forum, in pre-colonial Rwanda.84 "The 
name [gacaca] is derived from the word for 'lawn', referring to the 
fact that members of the gacaca sit on the grass when listening to and 
considering matters before them. "85 It has been suggested that in the 
pre-colonial period, prior to bringing a civil dispute before the 
Mwami, or king, individuals had to bring the dispute before the 
community.86 Serious crimes, however, such as conflicts between hier-
archical chiefs and homicide, were not brought to gacaca first, but 
rather were taken directly to the Mwami.87 In gacaca proceedings, re-
spected community figures served as "judges" who involved the entire 
community in a dispute resolution pr?cess.88 Typically, gacaca consid-
ered disputes around inheritance, civil liability, failure to repay loans, 
thefts, and conjugal matters.89 There is some evidence that gacaca was 
also used in conflicts amounting to minor criminal offenses such as 
79 Moussalli Report 2000, supra note 74, at 30. 
BIJ /d. 
81 /d. 
82 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 1. 
83 /d. 
84 Hm·sepian, supra note 67, at 7. 
85 Sarkin, supra note 7, at 159. 
86 Ho\"Sepian, mpm note 67, at 7, 8 n.30. 
87 /d. at 8. 
88 Sarkin, supra note 7, at 159. 
89 /d. 
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theft,90 In these situations, sanction for the act still resembled a civil 
settlement, such as compensation for the damage incurred, rather 
than imprisonment.91 The sanction arising from a gacaca proceeding 
was meant to serve two objectives.92 First, it allowed the accused to 
better appreciate the gravity of the damage that he or she caused.93 
Second, the sanction allowed the accused to reintegrate into the local 
community.94 
During the colonial period beginning in 1897, first the Germans 
and then the Belgians introduced a more formal state-centered legal 
system into Rwandan society.95 As the Belgian colonial project in 
Rwanda began to replace the traditional administration system based 
on family elders with appointed administrative leaders, it also created 
tribunals for each administrative unit.96 These tribunals "slowly de-
parted from customary law and began applying modern written legal 
texts, imported by the colonial powers and whose logic regarding 
penalties differed from gacaca's sole purpose of reconciliation. "97 
Consequently, legal pluralism evolved with gacaca, on the one hand, 
as an indigenous procedure based largely on traditional values and 
determining standards of individual and community behavior, and 
state laws, on the other hand, which were based predominantly on the 
Belgian framework.9B 
Following the decolonization process in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, gacaca saw somewhat of a revival in Rwanda.99 Throughout the 
colonization period, what had once been purely traditional had 
gradually evolved into a system more closely affiliated with state struc-
tures.100 Despite the closer connection to state structures and the lo-
cus of political power, post-colonial gacaca proceedings still main-
tained restitution and reconciliation as their primary aims. 101 
According to Phillip Reyntjens, who has produced one of the only 
field studies on gacaca, there seemed to be a certain complementarity 
oo Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 15. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
9! ld. 
94 /d. 
95 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 9. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 15. 
99 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 9. 
10° Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 15. 
1o1 See Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 10. 
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that developed between the gacaca and the state tribunal systems}02 
At times, the state tribunals served as appeals courts, taking into con-
sideration the decision made through the gacaca process.l03 At other 
times, gacaca served as both first and final forums.I04 Reynyens also 
noted that people seemed to turn to gacaca when the dispute was be-
tween family members or neighbors, whereas they were more likely to 
seek out state tribunals for disputes with strangers.to5 
Reports following the 1994 genocide confirmed that in some 
parts of the country, gacaca continued to function throughout the 
civil war.l06 In fact, in the months shortly after the genocide, the Min-
ister of Justice issued an action plan that called for the revalorization 
of gacaca as "a means of peaceful settlement of disputes as well as a 
way to reduce the number of cases submitted to the formal judicial 
structures and to return to a climate of confidence" in Rwanda.107 
Some evidence has even suggested that after the genocide, while the 
judicial and cantonal courts were not functioning in Rwanda, the 
breadth of conflicts heard before gacaca increased.l08 While still not 
hearing the types of cases proposed by the Gacaca Law in the after-
math of the genocide, it is clear that the expansion of gacaca since 
independence paved the way for the innovative approach proposed 
and eventually accepted by the government of Rwanda to try tens of 
thousands of people suspected of participation in the genocide.109 
A. The Gacaca Law (Organic Law No. 40/2000) 
On October 12, 2000, the Transitional National Assembly of 
Rwanda adopted Gacaca Law on the creation of gacaca jurisdic-
tions.llO A few months later, on January 26, 2001, President Paul Ka-
game sanctioned this legislation and the Constitutional Court ap-
proved it.lll While based upon the traditional practice of community 
dispute resolution, the current manifestation of gacaca has been 
1°2 See id. at 11. 
10! /d. 
104 /d. 
105 /d. 
106 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 13. 
107 /d. 
1°8 /d. at 13-14. 
109 Sec id. at 14. 
no Sec gcncralZv Gacaca Law, supra note 6. 
Ill Sec Anne M. Pitsch, The Gacaca Law of Rwanda: Possibilities and Problems in Adju-
dicating Genocide Suspects 2 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished working paper, Center for Inter-
national De,·elopment and Conflict Management, University of Maryland) 
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adopted specifically for the challenges posed by adjudicating crimes 
of a severe magnitude.112 The Rwandan government has tried to dis-
tinguish traditional gacaca from the proposed gacaca system by refer-
ring to it as either "modernized gacaca" or as "gacaca jurisdictions. "113 
Similar to the temporal jurisdiction established in Organic Law 8/96, 
pursuant to the Gacaca Law, the gacaca jurisdictions will try genocide-
related crimes that occurred between October 1, 1990 and December 
31, 1994.114 The Gacaca Law also essentially follows the framework of 
Organic Law 8/96 with regard to the categorization of suspects; how-
ever, gacaca jurisdictions will only hear Category II through IV 
cases.115 
1. Functioning of Gacaca Jurisdictions 
According to the Gacaca Law, each administrative umt m the 
country will have a gacaca jurisdiction.116 Each gacaca jurisdiction will 
have a General Assembly, a Bench, and a Coordinating Committee.117 
At the Cellule level, the smallest administrative unit in the country, 
the General Assembly will be comprised of all cellule inhabitants over 
the age of eighteen.118 The General Assembly of each cellule will then 
elect twenty-four people over the age of twenty-one of "high integ-
rity. "119 Of these twenty-four individuals, five will be selected to serve 
as delegates to the General Assembly at the Secteur level and nine-
teen will remain to serve on the Bench at the Cellule level,l20 Out of 
those nineteen who remain at the Cellule level, the Bench will elect 
five of its own members to serve on the Coordinating Committee.121 
This process of selecting delegates from the General Assembly to 
serve on the General Assembly at the next administrative level, as well 
112 See id. 
113 Uvin, supra note 2, at 7 n.5. 
114 See Gacaca Law, supra note 6. 
115 ld. 
116 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 16. The country of Rwanda is broken down into a se-
ries of administrative units. /d. The top administrative structure is comprised of twelve 
prefectures. /d. Each prefecture is subdivided into about ten communes, totaling 154. Each 
commune has approximately 50,000 citizens. Id. Each of these 154 communes is further 
divided into approximately ten secteurs, which are then further subdivided into six cel-
lules. /d. The cellule is the lowest administrative unit. Id. There are approximately 8,987 
cellules in Rwanda with each cellule representing a little O\'er 800 citizens. Id. 
117 Id. 
118 I d. 
119 Id. at 17. 
120 ld. 
121 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 17. 
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as determining the Bench and electing the Coordinating Committee, 
will then continue at the Secteur, Commune, and Prefecture levels.122 
In all, more than 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions will be created under 
Gacaca Law.123 
Gacaca jurisdictions will be able to hear cases involving genocide 
suspects in Categories II through IV as determined by Organic Law 
8/96.124 Those suspects who are in Category I, as defined by Organic 
Law 8/96, will not be transferred to gacaca jurisdictions, as their cases 
can only be heard by the ordinarily constituted courts.125 The entire 
categorization process begins at the Cellule level. Initially, the General 
Assembly in each Cellule level gacaca jurisdiction will provide testi-
monies and other evidence against suspected perpetrators and it will 
help the Cellule level Bench to draw up a list of individuals who par-
ticipated in the killings as well as a list of victims.126 The General As-
semblies will also participate in the hearing, without actively taking 
part in the final judgments.127 It is then the Bench's responsibility to 
work with the Public Minister to complete investigations based on the 
testimonies provided by General Assembly members and to classify 
suspects in the categories established by Organic Law 8/96.128 The 
Bench at the Cellule level will judge Category IV suspects-those who 
committed crimes against property.129 Judgments are made by consen-
sus or by majority voting.130 The Cellule level Bench will send the list 
of Category III suspects, along with any files it may have compiled, to 
the Secteur level gacaca jurisdiction.131 It will also send the list of 
Category II suspects and any files onto the Commune level gacaca ju-
risdiction. The list of Category I suspects will also be transferred to 
the Commune level gacaca jurisdiction, which will subsequently for-
ward the materials to the prosecutor's office at the court of first in-
stance.132 The Coordinating Committee of each gacaca jurisdiction is 
122 Sec id. At the Secteur, Commune, and Prefecteur levels there will be a General As-
sembly composed of fifty representatives from the level below it. /d. Each General Assem-
bly will choose a bench of twenty persons. /d. The Bench will then choose its own five-
member Coordinating Committee. /d. 
123 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 18. 
124 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 2. 
125 /d. 
126 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 19. 
127 Sec id. 
128 /d. 
129 /d. 
130 /d. 
131 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 19. 
132/d. 
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responsible for supervising the activities of the General Assembly and 
the Bench.l33 It is also responsible for writing down the judgments in 
an ad hoc register.134 Finally, the overall functioning of the gacaca ju-
risdictions will be supervised at the national level by a new Gacaca 
Tribunals Department within the Supreme Court.l35 
2. Sentencing in the Gacacajurisdictions 
Gacaca jurisdictions will generally follow the sentencing guide-
lines established by Organic Law 8/96.136 Similarly, gacaca jurisdic-
tions will rely heavily on confessions, which will result in reduced sen-
tencing for those found guilty. 137 Individuals convicted of Category IV 
crimes will be made to either repair the damage that they caused or to 
carry out community service that is equivalent to the restitution 
owed.i38 Those convicted of Category III crimes at the Secteur level, 
will generally receive a combination sentence of prison time and 
community service or public utility work. 139 For those who do not con-
fess and enter a guilty plea, they will receive sentences between five to 
seven years, with half of the sentence to be served in prison.I40 Those 
who confess after they have been placed on the list of perpetrators by 
the Bench at the Cellule level will receive sentences ranging from 
three to five years, with half the sentence to be served in prison. 141 
Finally, those convicted of Category III crimes who confess prior to 
being placed on the list of perpetrators will have their sentence re-
duced to between one to three years, with only half of the sentence to 
be served in prison.I42 
Similarly, Category II suspects who do not avail themselves of the 
confession and guilty plea procedure will receive prison sentences 
ranging from twenty-five years to life. 143 Those who avail themselves of 
the procedure after an indictment has been issued will be liable to 
serve a twelve to fifteen year sentence, with half of the sentence to be 
served in prison and the other half outside of prison participating in 
133 Jd. 
134 Jd. 
135 Id. at 20. 
136 SeeGacaca Law, supra note 6, arts. 68-71. 
137 See id. 
138 Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 20. 
139 ld. 
140 See Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 70(a). 
141 !d. art. 70 (b). 
142 !d. art. 70(c). 
143 /d. art. 69(a). 
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community service.144 Those who confess prior to being indicted are 
liable to serve a sentence lasting between seven and twelve years, with 
half of the sentence to be served in prison and the other half outside 
of prison participating in community service. 145 While the sentencing 
will generally follow the guidelines initially established by Organic 
Law 8/96, the community service element as a means to reduce 
prison population and to effectively reintegrate those convicted back 
into Rwandan society is entirely novel.i 46 
3. Appeals Procedure 
Improving on draft legislation for the gacaca jurisdictions, which 
did not allow for appeals at all levels, the Gacaca Law allows those ac-
cused and sentenced by the Bench in a particular jurisdiction to ap-
peal the decision one time to the next administrative level.i 47 As a re-
sult, decisions rendered at the Cellule level may be appealed at the 
Secteur level. Those rendered at the Sectlter level may be appealed at 
the Commune level. Finally, those rendered at the Commune level 
may be appealed at the Prefecture level. In addition, the Prosecutor 
General of the Supreme Court can decide, on his own initiative or 
pursuant to a request, to seize a case before a gacaca jurisdiction in 
the interest ofjustice.I4B 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND THE GACACAjURISDICTIONS 
The right to a fair trial as it is elaborated in international law, en-
compasses numerous guarantees to ensure the independence, objec-
tivity, impartiality, and equity of judicial processes.I49 Seeking to en-
sure the proper administration of justice, international treaties codifY 
various state party obligations with regard to the individual rights of 
the accused. 150 These rights include: the right to be equal before the 
law, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to a fair and public 
144 Sec id. art. 69 (b). 
145 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 69(c). 
146 Sec Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 20. 
147 Sec Uvin, supra note 2, at 6; Hovesepian, supra note 67, at 25. 
148 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 89. 
149 Sec generally International Covenant on Ci,·il and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Exec. Doc. No. 95-E, art. 14,999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Mrican [Banjul] Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 7, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Re\'. 5 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. 
150 See ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14; Banjul Charter, supm note 149, art. 7. 
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hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law, the right to a defense, and the right to appeat.151 
As a party to both the ICCPR and the African [Banjul] Charter 
on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), the Rwandan gov-
ernment must undertake to protect fair trial guarantees.152 The prior 
culture of impunity in Rwanda and the almost total devastation of the 
country's infrastructure and civil society in the early 1990s, however, 
has made this obligation nearly impossible to meet. 153 While gacaca 
jurisdictions are the latest hope for justice in Rwanda, various in terna-
tional human rights organizations and scholars on human rights have 
voiced concerns over whether or not the proposed gacaca jurisdic-
tions will comply with Rwanda's obligations, specifically under the 
ICCPR.154 In particular, Amnesty International has pinpointed the 
failure of the law establishing gacaca jurisdictions explicitly to ensure 
the right to legal defense.155 It has further questioned whether the 
composition of the gacaca jurisdictions can respect the principle of 
"equality of arms," which ensures that the defense and the prosecu-
tion have "a procedurally equal position during the trial and are in an 
equal position to make their case."156 Finally, they have raised ques-
tions as to whether gacaca jurisdictions can provide a competent, in-
dependent, and impartial hearing for those who are accused.157 Al-
though all fair trial protections are critical to the full protection of 
151 See ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14; Banjul Charter, supra note 149, art. 7. 
152 See TRoUBLED CouRsE OF JusTICE, supm note 8, at 4; see also ICCPR, supra note 149; 
Banjul Charter, supra note 149. 
153 See Uvin, supra note 2, at 2-3; Shabas, supra note 10, at 531-32. 
154 See TRouBLED CouRSE m- JusTicE, supra note 8, at 35-36; Hovsepian, supra note 67, 
at 29-30; Sarkin, supra note 7, at 21; Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 25. The Rwandan gov-
ernment is further obligated to ensure fair trial guarantees under its own constitution 
following the Arusha Peace Agreement, in which Rwanda adopted into domestic law the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and stated that the UDHR "shall take 
precedence over corresponding principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic 
of Rwanda, especially when the latter are contrary to the former." See Hovsepian, supm 
note 67, at 31. Since they are fully enshrined in Article 14 of the ICCPR, I will not deal with 
Rwanda's obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the UDHR. In addition, while Rwanda is 
equally obligated under the ICCPR and the Banjul Charter, the due process obligations of 
the ICCPR are more specific and have been interpreted frequently by the Human Rights 
Committee. Therefore, I will not address Rwanda's obligations under the Banjul Charter 
in this analysis. 
155 TRouBLED CouRsE OF JusTICE, supra note 8, at 33. 
156 ld. 
157 ld. at 33-34. 
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civil and political rights, perhaps these three form the core concerns 
surrounding the gacaca jurisdictions.15S 
Arguably, the gacaca jurisdictions, while not normally constitut-
ing courts, still fall within the domain of fair trial standards as estab-
lished by the ICCPR.159 The Human Rights Committee, which was es-
tablished pursuant to Article 28 of the ICCPR, has dealt specifically 
with the right to fair trial provisions codified in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR only once-in General Comment 13, adopted at its 21st ses-
sion in 1984.160 While largely talking about the failure of states to re-
port adequately on the specific implementation of their treaty obliga-
tions under Article 14, paragraph 4 of Comment 13 critically states 
that " [ t] he provisions of Article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals 
within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized. "161 
Article 14 of the ICCPR states: "All persons shall be equal before the 
courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law."162 It is clear from 
the Gacaca Law that persons to be tried in the gacaca jurisdictions fall 
within the ambit of Article 14 of the ICCPR, in that they are being 
brought before this forum "in the determination of any criminal 
charge against him. "163 The gacaca jurisdictions are "established by 
state law, they will apply state law, overall control will by exercised by 
state institutions (both judicial and executive power), penalties will be 
executed in state prisons; "clearly this type of tribunal should be gov-
erned by international human rights norms.' 64 Furthermore, the 
Human Rights Committee in issuing Comment 13 makes it clear that 
the ICCPR does not prohibit special courts, and states that "the trying 
of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place 
under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipu-
lated in Article 14. "165 
158 Sec id.; Moussal/i Report 2000, supra note 74, at 34. 
159 Sec Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 25. 
160 Sec gcncral(v !CCPR General Comment 13: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair 
and public hca1ing /Jy an independent court established /Jy law (Art. 14), Human Rights Commit-
tee, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc A/39/40 (1984), available at www.unhchr [hereinafter General 
Comment 13]. 
161 !d. 'l[4. 
162 ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14(1). 
163 Sec id. 
164 Sec Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 25. 
165 General Comment 13, supra note 160, 'li 4. 
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The Dakar Declaration, adopted on September 11, 1999, follow-
ing a seminar on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa and organized by 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, further ac-
knowledges that traditional courts must comply with the fair trial pro-
visions of the Banjul Charter, which are similar to, although somewhat 
less detailed than, those articulated in Article 14 of the ICCPR.166 
While recognizing that traditional courts play a critical role in many 
African countries, the Dakar Declaration also notes that "these courts 
also have serious shortcomings which result in many instances in a 
denial of fair trial. "167 Therefore, the Dakar Declaration announced 
unequivocally that, "[t]raditional courts are not exempt from the pro-
visions of the African Charter relating to fair trial. "168 By analogy, the 
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly found that fair trial 
standards apply equally to administrative and disciplinary legal pro-
cedures.169 Finally, the government of Rwanda has also acknowledged 
that international human rights instruments apply to the gacaca ju-
risdictions.170 
A. Right to a Defense 
According to Article 14 of the ICCPR, anyone facing criminal 
charges has the right "to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing .... "171 In addition, if the person fac-
ing criminal charges does not have legal counsel, he is entitled to be 
informed of his right to have legal assistance assigned to him "in any 
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by 
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it 
•••• " 172 While it appears clear from the language of the ICCPR that a 
person charged with a crime has an undisputed right to a defense, it is 
less obvious when legal assistance must be provided by the state in or-
der for the state to meet its obligations under the ICCPR.173 Accord-
ing to the language of the Article, the requirement to provide counsel 
166 See Vandeginste, supra note 5, at 25-26. 
167 Jd. 
168 /d. 
169 See id. at 25. 
170 REPUBUC OF RWANDA, REPLY 'ID AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S REPORT "RWANDA: 
THE TROUBLED CouRSE m JusTICE" 30 (2000), at http:/ /www.rwandal.com/govern-
ment/06_11_00news_ai.htm (hereinafter REPUBLIC OF RWANDA]. 
171 ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14.3.d. 
172 /d. 
173 See id. 
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is two-pronged. 174 First, a defendant seeking state-appointed counsel 
must demonstrate that he or she does not have the financial means to 
pay for counsel.l75 Second, the case must be one in which the interests 
of justice require that the person accused have free legal assistance.t76 
The Human Rights Committee has not addressed the substantive cri-
teria for this latter determination in Comment 13 of Article 14.177 In 
addition, it has not addressed a state's obligation to provide free legal 
counsel in non-capital cases in its published Views on communica-
tions submitted to it. 178 As a result, it is unclear what kind of obliga-
tion, if any, Rwanda has to provide free legal counsel for suspects of 
Category II through IV crimes in the gacaca jurisdictions, which are 
statutorily unable to apply the death sentence. 
Although Rwanda is not bound by any decisions handed down by 
the European Court of Human Rights, it is useful to look at how this 
court has interpreted Article 6 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights), which articulates a state's obligation 
to provide free legal counsel under particular circumstances.t79 Un-
like the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human 
Rights has been faced with determining whether a person accused of 
a crime has the right to free legal counsel in non-capital cases on a 
number of occasions.l80 Interpreting Article 6(3) (c) of the European 
174 !d.; Memorandum from Marguerite M. Dorn, Professor, Suffolk University Law 
School, to Jan Rocamora, Special Assistant, Ministry of Justice Rwanda (jul. 11, 1997), at 
http:/ /www.Iaw.suffolk.edu/academic/ihr/papers/counsel2.html [hereinafter Memoran-
dum]. 
175 ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14.3.d. 
176 !d. 
177 Sec General Comment 13, supra note 160, 'l[ 4. 
178 Sec Memorandum, supra note 174. 
179 Sec European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, 213 U .N .T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. no.5. [hereinafter European 
C01wention on Human Rights]. 
180 Sec gcncral(v Granger v. United Kingdom, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 469 (1990) (stating that 
whether legal aid must be provided shall be determined by considering the case as a 
whole-including the complexity of the issues inmh·ed and the potential sentence for the 
crimes and holding that a "difficult" and dispositive issue in the appeal along with a poten-
tial sentence of five years were sufficient to require the appointment of free legal aid); 
Quaranta, .. S\vitzerland rcp1intcd in 12 HuM. Rrs. LJ. 251 (1991) (stating that the serious-
ness of the offense and the severity of the sentence must be considered in determining 
whether appointing free legal counsel is in the interest of justice and holding that a maxi-
mum sentence of three years, combined with the possibility of activating a suspended sen-
tence, and the "\Vide range of measures" available to the court, were sufficient to require 
the appointment of free legal counsel without which [the defendant] would not have been 
able to present his case in an adequate manner); Pham Hoang v. France, App. No. 
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Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights 
has determined that the complexity of the case, the seriousness of the 
offense, and the potential maximum punishment all contribute to 
whether the interests of justice require the state to provide legal assis-
tance to the accused.l81 
Interestingly, the Gacaca Law does not mention the right to a de-
fense per se. Under the previous domestic system to try Categories I 
through IV, as established by Organic Law 8/96, the government of 
Rwanda acknowledged the right of the accused to defense counsel of 
his/her choosing, yet denied the right to free legal counsel provided 
by the state.l82 The government of Rwanda has maintained that this 
compromise applies for the gacaca jurisdictions as well, although it 
has not stated this specifically in legislation.l83 
Certainly there are a number of arguments that can be put forth 
as to why allowing for the appointment of free legal aid is preferable 
to the current stance by the government of Rwanda. Among these 
arguments are that the majority of the accused have little or no formal 
education, they have limited awareness of their rights, and they have 
no knowledge of how to defend themselves against the very serious 
allegations that they will face.l84 Applying the framework established 
by the European Court of Human Rights to determine whether the 
interest of justice requires that free legal aid be appointed to the ac-
cused, it seems that the complexity of the case and the potential sen-
tencing taken as whole for at least those accused of Category II would 
rise to the level where free representation was required. According to 
the Gacaca Law, those falling into Category II are charged with crimi-
nal acts intending to cause death.185 Category II sentences range from 
a minimum of seven years, with half of the term to be served in prison 
and the other half to be served performing community service, to a 
maximum of life imprisonment for those who do not confess.186 Ar-
guably, the element of intent that differentiates Category II defen-
dants from Category III defendants is an important element that 
13191/87, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 53 (199l)(holding that the defendant did not have the legal 
training essential to enable him to present and develop the appropriate arguments on 
complex issues himself). 
181 Granger, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 47; Quaranta, 12 HuM. RTS. LJ. at paras. 33, 34; 
Pham Hoang, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 37, 40. 
182 Organic Law 8/96, supra note 52, art. 36. 
18!! REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, supra note 170, at 29. 
184 'TROUBLED COURSE OF jUSTICE, supra note 8, at 33. 
185 See Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art 51. 
186 /d. arts. 69, 70. 
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would require legal assistance for an accused to present an adequate 
defense. 
In Quaranta v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights 
found that the defendant would not have been able to present his 
case adequately without legal representation.I87 In addition, in Pham 
Hoang v. France, the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
defendant did not have the sufficient training necessary to enable 
him to develop and present arguments without legal counsel.l88 Al-
though these holdings can only be persuasive, it is clear that both the 
complexity of the intent issue in Category II crimes along with the 
likely low level of training and competency of Category II suspects 
suggests that, supervening interests aside, Category II suspects should 
receive legal representation. In comparison, the remaining defen-
dants in Category III and IV both face less complex cases: those in 
Category III are charged with criminal acts without the intent to cause 
death and those in Category IV are charged with crimes against prop-
erty.189 In addition, their sentences are considerably less with the sen-
tence for Category IV being restitution of the damage caused and the 
sentence for Category III ranging from one to seven years with half of 
the sentence to be served through community service.190 While the 
European Court of Human Rights has found that, in conjunction with 
other factors, sentences of three to five years sufficed to require ap-
pointment of legal counsel, arguably the possible sentences for Cate-
gory III and Category IV crimes combined with the relatively straight 
forward cases would enable a person accused to defend him or herself 
adequately. 191 
187 Sec Quaranta, 12 HUM. Rrs. LJ at para. 36. In this case, the court considered Mr. 
Quranta's background, including that he was a young adult of foreign origin, with a long 
criminal record, and little occupational training. /d. at para. 35. These factors, in addition 
to the wide range of measures that were available to the court in sentencing, led the court 
to determine that "participation of a lawyer at the trial would have created the best condi-
tions for the accused's defense." Id. at para. 34. 
188 Pham Hoang, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 40. In this case, the court determined that 
the challenges Mr. Pham Hoang intended to raise on appeal were sufficiently complex and 
that he did not "have the legal training essential to enable him to present and develop the 
appropriate arguments on such complex issues himself." Id. 
189 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 51. 
190 /d. arts. 70, 71. 
191 Sec Granger, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 47. In this case, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights was particularly concerned with the complexity of the issue that Mr. Granger 
was raising in his appeal of a perjury conviction for which he was sentenced to five years in 
prison. /d. Mr. Granger's appeal would turn on establishing that certain evidence was in-
admissible as a precognition. /d. at paras. 47, 17(b). The court concluded that because Mr. 
Granger was appealing a five-year sentence by arguing a complex legal issue, that he was 
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A larger question about the "interests of justice" that arises in the 
case of Rwanda that neither the Human Rights Committee nor the 
European Court of Human Rights has had to deal with specifically, is 
the magnitude of those accused of crimes between October 1, 1990 
and December 31, 1994. Currently, the government of Rwanda claims 
that approximately sixty lawyers are in private legal practice in 
Rwanda.192 While this number has increased in the eight years since 
the genocide, it remains an inadequate number to address the cases 
of over 100,000 people who remain detained and who will come be-
fore one of the 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions established under the Ga-
caca Law.193 Those who had previously received free counsel in their 
cases before one of the twelve court chambers specializing in han-
dling genocide cases, did so with the support of Advocats Sans Fron-
tiers, not the Rwandan government.194 Despite this outside assistance, 
not all genocide suspects were able to receive assistance. 195 Given this 
track record, it seems impossible to imagine a scenario whereby all 
suspects-or even simply Category II suspects-are able to receive 
legal counsel. 
While it appears that those accused of Category II crimes should 
have the right to free counsel, in this case the larger interests of jus-
tice are at stake. Certainly Category II suspects cannot be detained 
indefinitely while awaiting represen tation.196 Similarly, the Rwandan 
government has made it clear, and victims groups have demonstrated, 
that releasing these detainees without any adjudicatory procedure is 
not in the interest of justice in post-genocide Rwanda. 197 Further-
more, the Human Rights Committee has noted that in capital cases, 
states must provide free legal counsel when a suspect does not have 
the means to pay for one himself in order to be in compliance with 
the ICCPR.198 As a result, it seems as if Rwanda must make the unsa-
vory yet prudent decision to focus efforts toward providing legal 
counsel to those who are accused of Category I crimes and who may 
face the death penalty. Arguably, they should also publicly reaffirm 
not fully in a position to comprehend, the interests of justice required the appointment of 
counsel. ld. at paras. 47, 48. 
192 REPUBLIC Q}' RWANDA, supra note 170 at 28. 
193 Id. at 28-29. 
194 Id. at 28. 
195 Jd. 
196 See generally TROUBLED CouRSE OF JusTICE, supra note 8; see also ICCPR, mpra note 
149, arts. 9, 10. 
197 See Moussalli Report 2000, supra note 74, at 30. 
198 See Memorandum, supra note 174. 
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the right of the accused to a defense before the gacaca jurisdictions, 
while maintaining that the government cannot provide free legal 
counsel to the accused in these procedures. 
B. Equality of Arms 
The concept of Equality of Arms often goes hand in hand with 
the right to a defense discussed above. The equality of arms principle 
necessitates that both parties in a case have a procedurally equal posi-
tion during the trial and are in an equal position to make their 
case.I99 According to Article 14(3)b of the ICCPR, among the mini-
mum guarantees entitled to a person accused of a criminal charge is 
the right "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing 
.... "20° The Human Rights Committee has interpreted this Article in 
Comment 13 to mean that a person accused of criminal charges must 
have access to the documents and evidence necessary to prepare his 
case.2o1 The Committee does note, however, that what constitutes 
"adequate time" depends on the circumstances of each case.202 Finally, 
the Human Rights Committee has reaffirmed that when the accused 
does not want to serve as his own defense, he should have recourse to 
a lawyer.2°3 Unlike the concerns raised in the previous section regard-
ing how to determine whether the "interests of justice" require that a 
lawyer be appointed to a defendant, the right to consult with counsel 
as articulated in Article 14 (3) b pertains to the need for procedural 
equality for both the prosecution and the defense.204 
To some extent, the structure of the gacaca jurisdictions obviates 
the need for a defendant to consult with a lawyer for this purpose.205 
According to Gacaca Law, once the Cellulelevel gacaca jurisdiction 
has compiled a list of suspects, pre-trial investigation and dossiers will 
be completed by les parquets and les auditorats militaries as they had un-
der Organic Law 8/96.206 Once the dossiers are complete, they will be 
199 TROUBLED COURSE Of jUS'I1CE, supra note 8, at 33. 
2oo ICCPR, supra note 149, art. 14(3)b. 
2o1 General Comment 13, supra note 160, , 9. 
202 /d. 
203 /d. 
204 Sec TRoUBLED CouRSE Of Jus neE, supra note 8, at 33. 
2°5 This is not to argue that the ability to consult with a lawyer might not be preferred, 
but rather that the structure of the process reduces the threat that the prosecution will 
outmatch the defense in legal acumen. 
206 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 4 7; Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 22. 
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returned to the Cellule level gacaca jurisdictions for categorization of 
the suspects and the transfer of dossiers to the relevant gacaca juris-
diction or to the courts of first instance.2°7 Although there is some 
concern that the cases would be judged on the basis of the dossiers 
compiled and passed on by what can be considered the prosecution, 
the process by which the actual hearing takes place reduces the risk 
that a defendant will not have an adequate chance to participate in 
his defense.208 
Recall that the process before the gacaca jurisdiction varies in 
part based on whether the accused has availed himself of the confes-
sion and guilty plea. In all cases, however, members of the General 
Assembly will be asked to give testimony either against the accused or 
on his behalf.209 The Bench will question those who choose to give 
testimony and the accused will· be able to respond to the testimony 
provided.210 Arguably, "the play of argument and counter-argument, 
ofwitness and counter-witness by the community basically amounts to 
the same as a fair defense, may be even better than what the formal 
justice system has until now produced."2II In addition, it is important 
to note that while the Bench will receive some training and the mem-
bers of the community will be educated about the Gacaca Law, the 
process of the gacaca jurisdictions remains community-based. There 
are no "lawyers" for the prosecution, nor are there rules of procedure 
that would prejudice the accused without legal representation. Ulti-
mately, it is the responsibility of the Bench to discern the truth and to 
render a majority decision. Again, it is important to reiterate that un-
der the Gacaca Law, those accused and sentenced have the right to 
appeal the Bench's decision once. In addition, the Prosecutor Gen-
eral of the Supreme Court can decide on his own initiative, or pursu-
ant to a request, to seize a case in the interest of justice. Based on 
these safeguards, it appears that the accused will have ample oppor-
tunity to participate equally in this judicial process. 
207 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 48; Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 22. 
208 See TRouBLED CouRsE OF JusTicE, supra note 8, at 33 (describing that defendants 
who do not have the aid of counsel will be unable to effectively refute accusations estab· 
lished in the dossier). 
2°9 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, arts. 64-66. 
210 /d. 
211 Uvin, supra note 2, at 5. 
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C. Fair; Independent, and Impartial Tribunal 
The principle of a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
codified in Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, encompasses both procedural 
guarantees enumerated in the subsections to Article 14-specifically 
paragraph 3, which outlines the minimum procedural guarantees for 
criminal hearings-and includes an intangible element that is not 
necessarily met even when all of the procedural elements are.2I2 The 
Human Rights Committee has tried to elaborate on this intangible 
element by specifYing that qualifications for judges, the manner in 
which judges are appointed, and the actual independence of the judi-
ciary from the executive and legislative branches, all play a role in 
whether tribunals succeed at being fair, independent, and impar-
tiaJ.2I3 The Human Rights Committee had further opportunity to ad-
dress specifically the notion of an independent and impartial tribunal 
in its Views adopted on October 20, 1993, pertaining to the commu-
nication submitted by 016 Bahamonde against Equatorial Guinea.2I4 
In this case, the Human Rights Committee stated that "a situation 
where the functions and the competence of the judiciary and the ex-
ecutive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to 
control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of article 14, 
paragraph 1, of the Covenant."2I5 
Considering the long history of impunity in Rwanda, and the ini-
tial track record of the genocide trials that proceeded under Organic 
Law 8/96, the concern over whether the gacaca jurisdictions can and 
will proceed in a fair, independent, and impartial manner is quite un-
derstandable. Although much of the analysis on this aspect of 
Rwanda's compliance with Article 14 of the ICCPR cannot be com-
pleted until actual trials begin sometime in 2002, there are a number 
of initial questions that can be addressed. First and foremost, in line 
with Comment 13 by the Human Rights Committee, critics have 
raised the question as to whether gacaca jurisdictions can be fair and 
impartial considering the general lack of legal training afforded to 
those who will be judging the accused.216 According to Article 10 of 
212 See General Comment 13. supra note 160, 1 5. 
213 Jd., 3. 
214 Sec Human Rights Committee, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Comm. No 
468/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993). 
215 ld. 'l[ 9.4. 
216 Sec TRou BU:n CouRSE m, JusTICE, supra note 8, at 34; Hovsepian, supm note 67, at 
37; Sarkin, supra note 7, at 163-64. 
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the Gacaca Law, the General Assembly of each gacaca jurisdiction will 
elect members to serve on the Bench and the Bench will in turn ap-
point members to the Coordinating Committee.217 Both elected and 
appointed members are to have lived in good conduct and to have 
always told the truth. They are to be honest, to speak openly, and have 
never been convicted of a crime with a sentence of more than six 
months. Finally, they are never to have participated in the crime of 
genocide or other crimes against humanity, and they are to be non-
discriminatory.2IB 
Despite these requirements, it is inevitable that some elected and 
appointed members will need to be replaced for either failing to meet 
these criteria or failing to fulfill their mandates. As a result, Article 12 
of the Gacaca Law establishes the reasons for which a member can be 
replaced and the procedure for that replacement.219 In addition, the 
government of Rwanda stated that the judges will receive training 
and, to this end, has approved the international NGO Advocats sans 
Frontiers to provide a two-week seminar to train the judges' trainers, 
who are people from the Rwandan Supreme Court. 22° Advocats sans 
Frontiers is also providing additional technical assistance for the ga-
caca jurisdictions by preparing and distributing a handbook on the 
Gacaca Law to educate the Rwandese populace.221 Obviously, this is a 
far cry from an optimal judicial situation; however, traditional courts 
such as the gacaca jurisdictions are not prohibited by the ICCPR, so 
long as they genuinely afford the guarantees stipulated in Article 
14.222 Compared to the current situation, in which many of the judges 
in the ordinary courts have only a few months' training and the trial 
process is prohibitively slow, the stipulations in the Gacaca Law that 
seek to increase the level of impartiality and competency of the 
judges, as well as the efficacy of the entire process, appear to be a step 
forward.223 Certainly, major concerns remain. Monitoring and con-
tinued assistance by the international community are the best means 
of ensuring that the judges can live up to this enormous task. 224 
217 See Pitsch, supra note 111, at 10. 
218 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 10. 
219 ld. art. 12. 
220 Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 37; Julia Crawford, Hopes and Fears as Kigali Launches 
Participative justice, AFRICA NEws, Oct. 11, 2001, available at http:/ /www.hirondelle.org 
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223 See TROUBLED CouRSE oF JusTICE, supra note 8, at 34. 
224 See Uvin, supra note 2, at 14-26. 
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Another critical concern is whether the gacaca jurisdictions will 
be able to function independently. On its face, the Gacaca Law ap-
pears generally to respect this principle.225 Complying with the Views 
adopted by the Human Rights Committee in Bahamonde v. Equitorial 
Guinea, the Gacaca Law attempts to draw clear distinctions between 
the gacaca jurisdictions and both the executive and legislative 
branches of the government.226 According to Article 11, individuals 
who occupy any administrative or executive positions at any level of 
local or national administration, who are active members of the police 
force or military, who are professional judges, or who sit on the gov-
erning body of any political party, religious order, or non-gov-
ernmental organization cannot be elected to the Bench.227 In addi-
tion, the mere structure of the gacaca jurisdictions, which will com-
prise over 10,000 different tribunals across the country with nineteen 
judges sitting on the Bench of each tribunal, decreases the possibility 
of manipulating the outcome of the gacaca proceedings.22s As the ac-
tual proceedings get underway, it will become readily apparent 
whether the gacaca jurisdictions will in fact offer the accused a fair, 
independent, and impartial tribunal. The Gacaca Law, however, estab-
lishes a solid foundation-given the post-conflict settings and the 
country's resources-for the observance of this core due process 
right. 
CoNCLUSION 
For more than eight years Rwanda has been searching for both 
justice and reconciliation.229 While there have been large improve-
ments in the domestic genocide trials, which began in 1996 after the 
Transitional National Assembly passed Organic Law 8/86, it is undis-
puted that the system of justice that Rwanda has maintained for over 
five years has failed.230 With over 100,000 pre-trial detainees languish-
ing in over-crowded prisons and local cachots, a compromise is un-
avoidable. Simply releasing pre-trial detainees, however, is not a feasi-
ble option for the government of Rwanda.231 In the face of this 
225 Sec Ho,·sepian, supra note 67, at 38-39. 
226 See id. 
227 Gacaca Law, supra note 6, art. 11; see also Hovsepian, supra note 67, at 39; Sarkin, su-
pra note 7, at 163-64. 
22s Sec Uvin, supra note 2, at 11. 
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daunting situation, the new gacaca jurisdictions have emerged as 
Rwanda's newest, and certainly most innovative, hope for justice and 
reconciliation. While perhaps not conforming to the letter of the law 
as laid out in Article 14 of the ICCPR, the new gacaca jurisdictions 
have the potential to embody its spirit by serving the need for justice 
and accountability in Rwanda while fostering a culture of protection 
for civil and political rights in a country that has long ignored 
them.232 Certainly, international human rights standards cannot be 
modified infinitely to suit the particular circumstances of each coun-
try without losing all of their power.233 At the same time, however, in-
ternational standards must be based on the application of possible-
not unrealistic-ideals.234 As was aptly put by Special Representative, 
Michel Moussalli: "The question facing Rwanda's international part-
ners is relatively simple: Do they grasp the nettle and participate, on 
the grounds that anything is preferable to the abuse in prisons, or do 
they hold firm to established legal principles and stay aloof, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that gacaca will fail? "235 Ultimately, the gov-
ernment of Rwanda will proceed with the gacaca jurisdictions as out-
lined in Gacaca Law. The best way to ensure that the gacaca 
jurisdictions protect fair trial standards is for the international com-
munity to work with the government of Rwanda to further educate 
the populace, encourage transparent participation, monitor the im-
partiality of the proceedings, and foster reconciliation and reintegra-
tion into Rwandese society. Perhaps the gacaca jurisdictions can be a 
first step toward greater observance of human rights in Rwanda. 
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